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5• The extent of regulation of insurance companies has grown significantly in 
recent decades.
• The ‘freedom with publicity’ regime which defined the regulatory approach 
from 1870 to 1970 appeared to work and ran with the grain of the market.
• Arguments that are given today for prudential regulation of insurers tend 
to be spurious or not well founded.
• Much government regulation of insurance companies is unlikely to achieve 
its declared objective and might even encourage problematic behaviours 
within insurance markets. 
• Regulation to ensure good governance and good information flows to 
markets may have some benefits and is less likely to cause the problems 
that other forms of regulation create.
• A case can be made for regulation designed to promote the objective of 
consumer protection. However, all the benefits of such regulation can be 
achieved with far fewer costs by creating a voluntary system of government 
regulation. Whether an insurance policy was written by a company which 
was part of the government regulatory system should be very clear to 




A distinction is often made between two types of financial regulation. Firstly, 
there is regulation related to market conduct and consumer protection. As 
far as insurance is concerned, this generally involves regulating the sales 
process for insurance products. In the UK, this form of regulation is mainly 
the responsibility of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Secondly, 
financial companies are subject to regulation relating to how they manage 
the risks they face and the capital they hold. That is, regulators set rules 
that are designed to ensure that the assets of insurance companies will be 
sufficient for them to meet their obligations to policyholders and to remain 
solvent. This form of regulation is often described as ‘prudential regulation’ 
and is handled in the UK by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA). It is 
the prudential regulation of insurance that this paper addresses.
At first sight, ensuring the solvency of an insurance company might be 
thought of as an obvious function of a government regulator. After all, the 
insolvency of an insurance company could seriously damage policyholders. 
A widow might be left with insufficient money to cope after the death of 
her husband, or pensions might go unpaid, or people might not receive 
compensation after a car accident, and so on. 
However, until the 1970s at least, the prudential regulation of insurance 
companies was extremely ‘light touch’ and yet insolvencies were very 
rare. This should not be surprising. Customers do not want to deal with 
insurance companies that are likely to not meet their obligations. 
Although policyholders wish to deal with insurance companies that are 
highly likely to meet their obligations, they will not want security at any 
price. Thus, the objective of the regulator should not be to prevent the 
failure of an insurer. Regulators should have a more limited objective of 
protecting policyholders’ legitimate interests, and possibly those of the 
wider public, where they are not protected by market mechanisms.
8These issues are examined below, and an alternative approach to 
regulation is proposed. This alternative involves returning to a lighter-touch 
regime and making prudential regulation voluntary.
9Regulation to ensure that the customer is not ‘duped’
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was the predecessor body of both 
the FCA and the PRA. Soon after its formation, it published a paper on the 
economic rationale for financial regulation. In this paper, Llewellyn (1999) 
laid out the classical reasons for the prudential regulation of insurance 
companies. Consumers, it was argued, might not have sufficient information 
to take rational decisions and information might be expensive to acquire. 
This will lead to what are often described as ‘information asymmetries’. 
Related to this, it was also argued that no amount of information given 
at the point of sale of a financial product could prevent an insurance 
company behaving imprudently after the product had been sold. Given 
that insurance contracts can last many decades and it is very difficult to 
specify in the contract how the insurer should behave in the future, this 
could lead to serious problems. It is argued that regulation can be used to 
ensure that the original aspirations of the purchasers of insurance, in terms 
of the security of their contract, are met.1
Insurance companies and systemic risk
More wide-ranging justifications for insurance company capital regulation 
are provided by Debbage and Dickinson (2013), writing as employees of 
the PRA. They note that the general objectives of the PRA include the 
promotion of the safety and soundness of the firms it regulates, especially 
in relation to financial stability. In addition, the PRA has a specific objective 
to help ensure that insurance company policyholders are appropriately 
protected. As well as reiterating arguments similar to those made by 
Llewellyn, Debbage and Dickinson make additional arguments for 
insurance regulation. Firstly, they suggest that the failure of an insurer 
may make it difficult for the insured to obtain cover on terms that are as 
favourable as those with the failed insurer. This might happen because 
the insured has a long-term contract and the risk factors surrounding the 
insured may have deteriorated.
Arguments for the prudential 
regulation of insurance companies
1 For a fuller discussion of this aspect of the justification for insurance company regulation, 
see Booth and Morrison (2007). See also below.
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The authors also express concerns about the possible impact on financial 
stability resulting from the failure of an insurer. By way of example, they 
cite AIG, which was rescued during the financial crisis, though they note 
that any impact on financial stability would have arisen as a result of AIG’s 
connections to the banking system which would have transmitted the risks 
from the insurer to the financial system as a whole.
Additionally, Debbage and Dickinson suggest that financial instability 
can arise if insurance companies are incentivised to act in a way that 
amplifies asset price movements. There could be problems, for example, 
if insurance companies sold relatively risky assets, such as equities, in 
concert and their actions then led to a fall in the price of those assets. As 
a consequence of this, insurers may then be concerned that they hold 
too little capital (because their remaining equity assets will have fallen in 
value) and, in an attempt to reduce risk and therefore reduce the amount 
of capital they need to hold, they might make further sales of their risky 
equity-based assets thus reinforcing the downward spiral.2
Debbage and Dickinson also argue that markets might be disrupted, with 
particular lines of insurance becoming unavailable, if a dominant player 
failed. French et al. (2015) take this argument further, suggesting that vital 
insurance services could be disrupted by an insurance company failure. 
Effectively, they use an argument analogous to that used in utilities, such 
as in the provision of water services. In that case, it is often claimed that 
the industry should be regulated in such a way that there is no disruption 
to services if a water company fails.
2 There are other, more technical, ways in which such problems could occur. For example, in 
the late 1990s, life insurance companies were worried about their capital position and bought 
long-dated gilts in a market with few assets available. They did this in order to hold assets 
to match their longer-dated liabilities. Their attempts to buy such gilts reduced interest rates 
which raised the value insurance companies had to put on their liabilities. This reduced their 
capital further and increased their desire to buy the longer-dated gilts.
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Critiquing the case for regulation
Are insurance companies really systemic?
It is possible that the activities of insurance companies might lead to 
system-wide problems throughout the financial services industry. But it is 
unlikely and, in any case, this possibility does not justify the regulation of 
insurance companies. 
The most serious systemic risks will arise when insurers are linked to the 
banking sector. This is why the case of AIG, which held credit default swap 
positions, is so often cited. However, to focus on regulating insurance 
companies to contain such risks is to hold the regulatory telescope the 
wrong way round. The regulation of banks is often proposed because of 
the systemic risk that arises from the failure of a bank. This is an arguable 
position, but one that is widely held in the literature. If banks are regulated 
for this reason, regulators should take into account the security of their 
insurance company (and other) counterparties when setting bank capital 
requirements. This is precisely the approach of the Basel Accord rules 
which require a bank to vary its minimum capital requirements with the 
credit quality of its counterparties. But the financial regulator need not, 
and should not, then dictate the capital of the counterparties (at least, not 
on this ground). Having the financial regulator interfere in the business 
of an entity that has an important relationship with a bank could lead to 
the absurd position of a financial regulator taking responsibility for any 
company the failure of which might significantly affect the capital position 
of a bank.
The other main financial stability argument is related to the possible 
impact of insurance companies on investment markets. As noted above, a 
problem may arise if insurance companies unconsciously co-ordinate their 
investment behaviour and, in doing so, move investment markets in such 
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a way that their solvency is collectively impaired. Although, such problems 
have arisen from time-to-time, regulation is likely to exacerbate rather than 
alleviate such problems. This is because the response of insurers to asset 
price movements tends to arise from attempts to protect their regulatory 
capital position. 
For example, the regulator typically requires insurance companies to hold 
more capital when they invest in equities. A decline in the value of equities 
will reduce the amount of capital insurance companies hold, because 
their assets will have fallen in value relative to their liabilities. This, in turn, 
might lead insurance companies to reduce their equity investment further 
in order to bring the amount of capital they are required to hold by the 
regulator down to the level they actually hold. If all companies reduce their 
investment in equities in this way, the problem will be exacerbated and 
might even turn into a vicious circle. 
In the absence of regulation, insurance companies could make judgements 
about the price of and prospective returns from equities in relation to their 
risk. If prices fall, they might be happy to hold less capital, expecting the 
problem to be temporary. At the very least, if companies make independent 
decisions about how much capital to hold, it is less likely that their 
behaviour will be as co-ordinated and cause the problems described. 
Similar arguments have been made about the problem of rigid regulations 
leading to co-ordinated behaviour in the banking sector, including during 
the financial crisis (see Myddelton 2009).
In the past, regulators have relaxed capital requirements in the above 
circumstances, which is perhaps an indication of regulators admitting that 
regulation is at least part of the problem rather than the solution to such 
co-ordinated behaviour and apparent systemic risk in asset markets.
Do regulators need to protect customers against information asymmetries?
The most compelling reason for the prudential regulation of insurance 
companies would appear to be the information asymmetry argument. The 
important question here is why the soundness of insurance companies 
should be ‘under-supplied’ in the market. The providers of capital to 
insurance companies do not want insurers to become insolvent and 
neither do their policyholders. The sound management of an insurance 
company should have a value in the market. Insofar as reduced risk comes 
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with a cost, why would consumers not be willing to pay the cost? As far 
as the providers of capital are concerned, well-capitalised insurers will 
provide lower returns to shareholders, but they will also be less risky for 
shareholders and policyholders.
The standard answer appeals to the so-called ‘lemons’ problem (see 
Akerlof 1970). An insurer that was managed soundly may not be able to 
distinguish itself from a less sound company in the eyes of policyholders. 
As such, an insurance company might get no benefit from holding more 
capital or from otherwise behaving soundly.3 This could lead to lower 
prudential standards and a reduction in the size of insurance markets.
However, the existence of information asymmetries is not in itself a 
problem that demands government regulation. There are institutions within 
the market that can assess the soundness of an insurer and communicate 
this in simple ways. These institutions include credit rating agencies and 
financial intermediaries. These market institutions will employ investment 
analysts and financial advisers who should be able to interpret complex 
information. Indeed, the system for regulating life insurance that prevailed 
from 1870 until 1970 relied on companies publishing information with the 
expressed purpose that it could be interpreted by intermediaries and, 
through that mechanism, affect consumer decisions.4 During that century 
there were only two failures of life insurance companies and neither of 
those affected policyholders adversely (see Booth 2007).
In fact, regulatory interventions have worked against the development 
of market institutions that solve these problems without regulation. Until 
1979, the sale of insurance and retail investment products was essentially 
unregulated or, more correctly, it was regulated by general contract law 
and by market institutions. One important such market institution was a 
maximum commission agreement amongst life insurance companies. 
This helped ensure that intermediaries made recommendations based on 
the soundness of the life insurance company whose policies they were 
recommending, or on the basis of other characteristics valued by the 
purchaser. This agreement was abolished by the competition authorities 
under pressure from the EU.
Markets can also develop corporate governance arrangements to deal 
with specific problems that might be of concern to customers. The mutual 
3 Indeed, because of limited liability, shareholders might benefit from the upside of risky 
strategies whilst their losses from the downside of risky strategies are limited to the value of 
their shares.
4 This system was known as ‘freedom with publicity’.
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ownership form, for example, reduces conflicts of interest between 
policyholders and owners and therefore reduces the significance of 
information asymmetries. The mutual form might be inefficient in other 
ways: for example, it makes access to capital more expensive and it tends 
to increase conflicts of interest between managers and owners. It is notable 
that the number of mutual life insurance companies has fallen almost to 
zero since the statutory regulation of insurance companies expanded in 
the 1980s. 
Another, more persuasive argument for regulation, related to the 
information asymmetry argument, is the ‘time consistency’ or ‘commitment’ 
problem (see Booth and Morrison 2007; Llewellyn 1999). This problem is 
a little more subtle than the standard information asymmetry arguments. 
Even if an insurer were sound when a customer takes out an insurance 
policy, over the course of the life of the policy, which may last decades, 
the insurer might begin to behave more recklessly. This is a more difficult 
problem to resolve than the information asymmetry problem. However, it 
can be resolved by the adoption of particular types of corporate structures 
– especially the mutual structure which, as noted, helps to better align 
the interests of owners and customers. Nevertheless, this specific problem 
can justify the use of statutory regulation and it is addressed further below.
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Public choice arguments against 
government regulation
As well as critiques of the specific arguments which have been developed 
to justify the prudential regulation of insurance companies, the whole 
conceptual framework used to justify government regulation of insurers 
can be questioned. 
Proponents of regulation often use ‘market failure’ arguments to justify 
regulation (see, for example, Debbage and Dickinson 2013). Indeed, the 
arguments above fall into that category. However, it should not be assumed 
that regulators have the knowledge or will in practice act to remove market 
failures efficiently. Just as participants in markets do not act according to 
the textbook assumptions of perfect competition, regulators cannot be 
assumed to act in such a way that imperfections will be corrected. For 
example, they will not have knowledge of policyholders’ preferences for risk. 
In addition, regulation can be captured by industry insiders and designed 
to make new entry and competition more difficult. Regulation may also be 
used to pursue the objectives of politicians or regulators themselves. This 
may lead to the development of highly complex forms of regulation and 
control which, in turn, will lead to a requirement for large regulatory bureaus 
to implement regulation and supervise insurance companies. In summary, 
it is very difficult, in advance, to determine whether giving particular powers 
to a regulatory body will improve or worsen consumer welfare.
As a result of these problems, regulation may have damaging side effects 
and may not achieve the desired results. The failure of Equitable Life in 
2000 provides a good example of this. It was notable, for example, that 
insurance regulation had expanded rapidly through the 1980s and 1990s 
whilst not, in any sense, addressing the huge risks that the company 
was taking on. Indeed, the particular actuarial and accounting methods 
that regulation encouraged were especially unsuited to the risks that the 
Equitable had taken on.
Year Cost of FSA (PRA 
and FCA combined 
for 2016/17), £million
Cost of FSA (PRA 
and FCA combined 







There is also little incentive for a government regulatory body to contain 
costs, which, in the UK, are effectively borne by insurance companies’ 
customers. The implementation of the EU Solvency II regime is estimated 
by the UK Treasury to cost £2.6 billion with an ongoing cost of £196 million 
a year.5 The total length of the Solvency II directive and related instruments 
from the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority is 
3,200 pages and the UK regulator has imposed further costly requirements 
on top.
The increase in the total costs of financial regulation since the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) was formed has been substantial. Insurance 
companies are now regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Table 1 shows staff costs for 
the FSA and then the FCA and PRA combined for 2001/02, 2006/07, 
2011/12 and 2016/17.
Table 1: Direct costs of main government financial regulatory bodies 
– selected years
It is perhaps not surprising that there was an increase in supervision 
costs following the 2008 crisis, though whether there should have been 
is another matter. However, even since 2011/12, the total direct costs 
of financial regulation have increased by 46 per cent. In addition to the 
direct costs of regulation, there are costs of compliance borne by firms 
(and their customers) and costs borne by consumers resulting from market 
distortions and reduced innovation.
The side effects of earlier government regulations in encouraging 
herding behaviour amongst investors is exacerbated by the international 
harmonisation of regulation. This approach to regulation, which increasingly 
5 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmtreasy/324/324.pdf 20
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6 This later evolved into bodies with different names. See, for example, http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407173247/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/upload/as-
sets/www.brc.gov.uk/principlesleaflet.pdf
dominates the financial services landscape both inside and outside the EU, 
can raise systemic risk because insurers might respond in a like manner 
to a shock, with their behaviour driven by regulatory requirements. The 
effect was summed up by Yale law academic and NBER scholar Roberta 
Romano (2014) in her paper describing the Basel Approach to bank capital 
regulation: 
Recent experience suggests that regulatory harmonization can 
increase, rather than decrease, systemic risk, an effect that 
is the precise opposite of the objective of harmonization. By 
incentivizing financial institutions worldwide to follow broadly 
similar business strategies, regulatory error contributed to a 
global financial crisis…The Article contends, accordingly, that 
there would be value added from increasing the flexibility of 
the international financial regulatory architecture as a means of 
reducing systemic risk.
In addition, the IMF (2015: 33) has suggested that pension funds and 
insurance companies are less able to absorb shocks in asset markets 
arising from the behaviour of other institutions as a result of capital 
regulation.
Cognisant of the arguments set out in this section, the Better Regulation 
Task Force6 suggested in its various reports that alternatives to direct 
government regulation should always be considered. These alternatives 
included doing nothing, voluntary codes of practice, and using regulatory 
approaches that evolve within the market itself.
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Before discussing the details of the proposed regulatory regime, it should 
be noted that an important aspect of the legal regime in relation to insurers 
is the approach to managing bankruptcy. Unlike banks, insurers tend to fail 
in ‘slow motion’ – this is true even with non-life insurance such as motor, 
aviation or liability insurance. A shortfall of assets becomes apparent 
and the company has to be wound up. Since 1870, the normal approach 
with life insurance companies is to top slice payouts to the insured.7 The 
insurance company’s business can be run-off, perhaps being sold as a 
book of business to another company. This is the approach being taken to 
the business of the Equitable, the most recent large life insurance failure. 
The law should continue to facilitate this approach, which ensures an 
equitable way of dealing with losses and enforcing contractual obligations. 
However, this leaves the question of how far regulation should go beyond 
simply ensuring an orderly failure of insurance companies.
Requiring disclosure
Although scepticism is expressed above about the need for regulation 
to address the problem of information asymmetries, it is worth noting the 
relative success of the form of regulation used throughout the 20th century. 
Such regulation was, in fact, designed to address information shortfalls. The 
1870 Life Insurance Companies Act (and a number of following Acts which 
made small amendments and extensions to the scope of the legislation) 
allowed insurers to be free to act as they wished as long as they published 
information to the market. Correspondence between the overseeing 
government department (the Board of Trade) could also take place and, if 
desired, be published. This act was not intrusive and it was successful in 
ensuring that there was a thriving and stable insurance market. 
A new approach to insurance 
regulation
7 Since 1975, policyholders have been compensated by a central fund (now the Finan-
cial Services Compensation Scheme) to ensure that they receive benefits of the value of 
between 90 per cent and 100 per cent of their claims if their insurance company is insolvent. 
This scheme is funded by the industry.
8 There is a good description of the winding-up and run-off processes in French et al (2015), 
page 46.
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In this spirit, it is suggested that regulation along the lines of Pillars II and 
III of the EU Solvency II insurance regulation framework has the greatest 
chance of being most helpful and least damaging. These pillars require 
procedures to be adopted by insurance companies that ensure sound 
governance and transparency in their operation. There are dangers arising 
from regulators requiring insurers to produce large numbers of documents 
to demonstrate that they are soundly governed. Process can easily become 
more important than the crucial job of ensuring accountable governance. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that these aspects of Solvency II are the 
least problematic and may bring certain advantages. 
No need to regulate capital
However, regulation should not require insurance companies to hold a 
specific level of capital designed to be apparently compatible with a given 
probability of insolvency. The most important and complex aspect of the 
Solvency II EU framework, as implemented by the PRA, involves the 
regulator setting regulatory capital levels for each company. As discussed 
by Bettis et al. (2016)9 and the references therein, under the Solvency 
II framework, the regulator sets capital requirements so that insurance 
companies have a 1 in 200 chance of failure over one year.
Firstly, this raises the question ‘why 1 in 200?’. Reducing risk comes at a 
cost. How do we know now much risk policyholders want to take? The theory 
around information asymmetries does not suggest that regulators know 
more about how much risk policyholders want to take than policyholders 
do, only that policyholders might not be able to effectively monitor insurance 
companies. Secondly, regulating capital to ensure a given probability of 
failure for all companies requires the development of a generalised model 
of capital setting that is necessarily incredibly complex. This leads directly 
to the problem of the complexity, length and cost of Solvency II discussed 
above. Furthermore, mathematical models designed to set capital can 
only ever quantify risk and not the kind of radical uncertainty that often 





Indeed, the idea that we need regulators to determine insurance company 
capital is highly questionable. As Bettis et al. note, ‘in practice, insurance 
companies normally hold sufficient capital such that the risk of ruin is far 
lower than this level [1 in 200]. Large reinsurance companies such as 
Munich Re and Swiss Re typically aim for a credit rating in the region of 
AA. An estimate of the average default probability for corporations rated AA 
over a one-year horizon is currently 0.02% or 1 in 5,000’. 
The Solvency II capital-setting framework and its derivative UK regulation 
should be replaced by a simple requirement for an insurance company to 
demonstrate its solvency and the extent of its free capital. It should be able 
to do so at any time upon request from the regulator and periodically publish 
the result and the assumptions upon which the calculations are based. The 
role of the regulator should be to monitor and supervise. It should be able 
to raise concerns with the company privately and, if deemed appropriate, 
publish correspondence (together with responses from the company) 
about the risks the company faces and its underlying solvency position. 
Making regulation voluntary
The above model would be an updated version of the approach to insurance 
company regulation that was taken before the UK entered the European 
Union. It addresses the main problems in insurance markets which 
economists believe may cause ‘market failure’. However, the proposal does 
not address the ‘commitment problem’. How does a policyholder know that 
an insurance company that is sound at the time of sale will remain sound 
throughout the term of the policy (and possibly beyond in the case of some 
insurance contracts)? As has been discussed, this problem can be resolved 
by market institutions such as the mutual ownership model. However, a 
voluntary regulation regime run by a government regulator would provide an 
additional mechanism that would compete with approaches that developed 
within markets designed to ensure that insurance companies operated in 
the best interests of policyholders.
Through this mechanism, a state insurance regulator would provide a 
regulatory framework which insurance companies could choose to join. 
This could provide regulation on, for example, the amount of capital 
that should be held by an insurer. If a company left the state regulatory 
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framework, existing business would continue to be regulated by the 
government regulator and new business would have to be written in a 
separate subsidiary which would be outside the government regulatory 
regime. This approach is necessary to resolve the ‘commitment problem’: 
consumers must know that, once they take out a policy, it will be regulated 
under the regime promised. If consumers deemed the benefits of the 
regulatory regime to be greater than the costs, they would be attracted to 
doing business with companies that subjected themselves to the regime. 
It would seem unlikely that consumers would underestimate the value of 
regulation. Of course, a company’s products should be clearly badged to 
show whether they are regulated by the government regulator. 
This mechanism would allow innovation in private forms of regulation. 
It would also ensure that innovation within the market was not stifled by 
regulation. The approach would give the government regulatory body 
an incentive to ensure that regulation was proportionate and efficiently 
administered. Customers could also choose to do business with insurance 
companies regulated according to another country’s regime, including EU 
companies following an unreformed Solvency II regime post Brexit.
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In common with other parts of the financial system, there has been a 
huge expansion of the regulation of insurance companies in recent 
years. However, such regulation rarely comes with any explicit and solid 
justification. The reasons given for prudential regulation of insurance 
companies are tenuous and do not take into account the difficulties of 
improving market outcomes through regulation.
The strongest justification for regulation is that consumers might lack the 
ability to make judgements about the soundness of insurance companies. 
With this in mind, regulation should focus on the provision of information 
and not inhibit the development of market institutions designed to interpret 
information. Regulation designed to ensure good governance within 
insurance companies is likely to be more productive (or less unproductive) 
than the direct regulation of insurance company capital which has many 
problematic side effects. The economic arguments for regulation lead 
strongly in the direction of insurance company regulation from statutory 
bodies being voluntary. If such regulation were effective, it would be valued 




Akerlof, G. A. (1970) The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3): 488-500.
Bettis, O., Dietz, S. and Silver, N. (2016) The Risk of Climate Ruin. Centre 
for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper No. 243 and 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment 
Working Paper No. 217. London. http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/
wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Working-Paper-217-Bettis-et-al-2016.pdf
Booth, P. M. (2007) Freedom with Publicity - The Actuarial Profession 
and United Kingdom Insurance Regulation from 1844 to 1945. Annals of 
Actuarial Science 2(1): 114-145.
Booth, P. M. and Morrison, A. D. (2007) Regulatory Competition and Life 
Insurance Solvency Regulation in the European Union and United States. 
North American Actuarial Journal 11(4): 23-41.
Debbage, S. and Dickinson, S. (2013) The Rationale for the Prudential 
Regulation and Supervision of Insurers. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 
216-222.
De Soto, J. H. (2009) The Fatal Error of Solvency II. Economic Affairs 
29(2): 74-77.
French, A., Vital, M. and Minot, D. (2015) Insurance and Financial Stability. 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 242-257.
Llewellyn, D. (1999) The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation. 
Occasional Paper 1. London: Financial Services Authority.
References
26
International Monetary Fund (2015) Global Financial Stability Report 
April 2015: Navigating Monetary Policy Challenges and Managing Risks. 
Washington DC: IMF.
Myddelton, D. R. (2009) Accounting aspects of the financial crisis. In 
Verdict on the Crash – Causes and Policy Consequences (ed. P. M. Booth). 
London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Romano, R. (2014) For Diversity in the International Regulation of 
Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture. 
Yale Journal on Regulation 31(1): 1-76.
27
The Institute of Economic Affairs
2 Lord North Street
London SW1P 3LB
Tel 020 7799 8900
Email iea@iea.org.uk
